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Electronic Medical Records and the
Challenge to Privacy: How the United
States and Canada Are Responding
By ELANA RIVKIN-HAAS
I. Introduction
Once a simple interaction based on trust, the doctor-patient
relationship has been dramatically reshaped by the modern health
care system. Treatment has become specialized, often spread among
numerous healthcare providers, requiring that patient records be
available to be viewed by many. Moreover, technological advances
have made comprehensive electronic health record storage a viable
reality,' forcing consideration of new legal and ethical questions
regarding privacy.
A centralized electronic medical records system seems attractive
for several reasons: It has the potential to facilitate increased
communication between healthcare providers and patients, to help
decrease costs, and to improve the overall quality of care. However,
for electronic health records to be successful, patients must feel
confident that their personal information will be secure; otherwise,
they may be unwilling to disclose critical information. This
unwillingness would prove detrimental to the quality of their
healthcare and thus to their health. Currently, a tension exists
between the push toward electronic centralization of medical records
' University of California Hastings College of the Law, J.D. Candidate 2011;
Middlebury College, B.A. in English Literature, 2005. I'd like to express my
gratitude to everyone who has helped me in the writing of this note, including the
wonderful and dedicated HICLR staff and board.
1. See generally Lawrence 0. Gostin & James G. Hodge, Jr., Personal Privacy
And Common Goods: A Framework For Balancing Under The National Health
Information Privacy Rule, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1439, 1440 (2002) (noting that electronic
records are increasingly used to store health records).
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and the need to protect patients' private information.
Electronic medical records allow for increased availability,
aggregation, and dissemination of medical information. With the
spread and advances of technology, the number of people who
potentially have access to an individual's sensitive health information
increases dramatically. This ease of information flow, in some ways,
conflicts with notions of patient decisional autonomy. Patients may
consent to having their health record stored in a centralized,
electronic system, but exactly how patients' expectations and beliefs
about how that information will or should be used, and who will or
should be able to view it may vary widely. Thus, in many cases,
access and secondary uses of personal information may exceed the
scope of what patients, upon disclosure, believe they have consented
to. The privacy concerns in the technology era, therefore, stem
primarily from insufficient control by patients over secondary uses of
health information and the future harms that may result from such
unauthorized or undesired access to such information.
This paper first examines the existing privacy law standards
applicable to medical records in the United States and Canada and
then considers whether the current privacy framework offers patients
adequate protection against these new privacy concerns. Section II
will consider the common law of privacy and how, if at all, it can
apply in the context of electronic medical records. Section III will
focus on constitutional interpretations of privacy in both the U.S. and
Canada. Section IV concludes the piece with a comparison of the
statutory schemes currently governing electronic health records in the
U.S. and Canada.
II. American Common Law
"Privacy" in both American and Canadian societies means many
different things to different people, reflecting the complexity of the
term and the wide range of ways the concept is employed in these
legal systems. As one scholar explained, "[t]he term 'privacy' is an
umbrella term, referring to a wide and disparate group of related
things."2 Because the term "privacy" is used so broadly, it can often
be difficult to tell exactly what it means to "violate" one's privacy. At
a basic level, the concept of privacy connotes that some information,
some decisions, and our physical body should be free from intrusions
2. Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REv. 477, 486 (2006).
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by others. As Justice Brandeis and his co-author Samuel D. Warren
wrote: "the right to life means the right to enjoy life - the right to be
let alone."3
Physical invasions of one's person without consent form the basis
of the traditional torts of battery and assault and usually present a
clear kind of injury from unwanted physical contact.! Brandeis and
Warren, however, talked about invasions of privacy that caused no
direct, physical injury. Instead, they focused on invasions of privacy
that involve injury to feelings.! They recognized that incorporeal
harm resulting from damage to one's "reputation" through
defamation, etc., could be legally cognizable.' Thus, a right to
privacy, in some ways, means the right to protect one's personal
dignity.
Prosser expanded upon the ideas of Brandeis and Warren,
synthesizing redressable privacy violations as
1. intrusion upon the plaintiff's seclusion or solitude, or into his
private affairs;
2. public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the
plaintiff;
3. publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public
eye;
4. appropriation, for the defendant's advantage, of the plaintiff's
name or likeness.
However, these traditional American torts that result in an
invasion of privacy offer remedies for only a narrow range of
circumstances in the healthcare context. Only the torts of intrusion
and public disclosure appear applicable, and even these have certain
limitations.'
For example, to bring a successful suit for public disclosure, the
3. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
REV. 193, 193 (1890).
4. Solove, supra note 2, at 487.
5. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 3, at 197.
6. Id.
7. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A(2) (1977).
8. Patricia Sanchez Abril & Anita Cava, Health Privacy in a Techno-Social
World: A Cyber-Patient's Bill of Rights, 6 Nw. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 244, 264
(2008).
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information disclosed must be of a shameful nature.9 This confines
the protection offered by this tort to health information that is of an
"unpleasant or disgraceful" nature or pertains to an embarrassing
disease or some "hidden physical or psychiatric problems."'0 It would
seem, then, that much of a patient's health information may not be
protected because it does not fit the "shameful" criteria. Further,
"the success of a privacy tort claim hinges on an assessment of the
reasonableness of the victim's expectation of privacy in the space
invaded or information disclosed,"n and "[a]s a general rule, if
information has been voluntarily disclosed by a patient to anyone in a
non-fiduciary capacity ... it is no longer deemed 'private' and
therefore privacy torts do not apply."" Thus, none of these violations
of the privacy torts appear to deal directly with such problems
associated with the computerized storage of health information as
security breaches, secondary use, or distortion of data, nor do they
offer clear remedies. Despite sharing in the common law legal
tradition, Canada has not fully developed its jurisprudence in the area
of the tort for invasion of privacy."
Although not considered among the traditional privacy torts,
"breach of confidentiality" is an important dimension of "privacy,"
particularly as it relates to medical records.14 The idea of "privacy"
focuses on the individual's right to be free from intrusion upon his or
her person or dignity while "confidentiality" addresses the
expectations that information shared in certain relationships, such as
the one between doctors and patients, will be held in confidence." As
courts have explained, "[o]nly one who holds information in
confidence can be charged with a breach of confidence."16
Before corporate care became the norm, patient data was
9. Id. at 264-65.
10. Id. at 265 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. B, (1997);
see also Goordt v. Tribune Entm't Co., 106 F.3d 215, 220 (7th Cir. 1997)).
11. Abrial & Cava, supra note 8, at 264.
12. Id. at 265.
13. See John D.R. Craig, Invasion of Privacy and Charter Values: The Common-
Law Tort Awakens 42 McGILL L.J. 353, 355-58 (1997).
14. See Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Privacy's Other Path: Recovering
the Law of Confidentiality, 96 GEO L.J. 123, 151-52 (2007).
15. Id. at 174.
16. Nicolas P. Terry, What's Wrong With Health Privacy, 5 J. HEALTH & BIOMED.
L. 1, 6 (2009) (quoting Humphers v. First Interstate Bank of Or., 696 P.2d 527, 530
(Or. 1985)).
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protected by the physician-patient relationship, violations of which
could be remedied through the theory of "breach of confidence and
operationalized through implied contract or tort doctrines."" With
the increase of managed care, however, "access to the patient's health
file is not brokered by the treating physician in their role as
confidant ... [and] rarely will any one functionary act as
'gatekeeper'" 8 Because the managed care system requires many
people to have regular access to patient records - including health
administrators, insurance companies, employers, regional health
database organizations, and information brokers - monitoring and
regulating the flow of patient information has become more difficult.
This is especially true because "[t]he duty of confidentiality arising at
the point of clinical care or research simply does not convey a right to
confidentiality in all these important contexts."19 Thus, in the
corporate healthcare context, the traditional confidentiality model
may not offer broad enough protection for patients against
unauthorized disclosures of their medical information. It may be
difficult, for example, to use breach of confidentiality to address
problems such as hacking or regulating how information is used once
it has been passed on to approved secondary users.
In some ways, unauthorized secondary use of patient information
"resembles breach of confidentiality, in that there is a betrayal of the
person's expectations when giving out information." 20 However,
breach of confidentiality is "not well suited to protecting a person's
interests in knowing when personal information will be collected and
for what purposes, nor has the theory been developed as a remedy for
inadequate controls over storage or security of information, or to
prevent discrimination on the basis of a person's health status."2 1
Technology has centralized health care information, and this has
increased patients' fear over who will gain access to that information
and for what purposes. These concerns are often expressed in terms
of "privacy," but, in many ways, they really reflect individuals' desires
to maintain control over personal data.
17. Id. at 23.
18. Roger S. Magnusson, The Changing Legal and Conceptual Shape of Health
Care Privacy, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHIcs 680, 682 (2004).
19. Lawrence 0. Gostin, James G. Hodge, Jr., & Mira S. Burghardt, Balancing
Communal Goods And Personal Privacy Under A National Health Informational
Privacy Rule, 46 ST. Louis U. L.J. 5, 13 (2002).
20. Solove, supra note 2, at 522.
21. Magnusson, supra note 18, at 682.
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In many instances, once a patient's information has been
collected, he or she is excluded from the decisions about how
personal data is used.22 Although people may be aware, upon
disclosure, that their personal information will be used for purposes
beyond that for which it was initially collected, technology allows for
secondary uses far beyond those that patients (or even doctors)
anticipate upon disclosure and for which they may not have
consented if they had known of them.2 However, because American
courts have not recognized exclusion from such decisions as a
cognizable harm, there is no tort remedy for such situations. 24 It
would be inefficient, as well as burdensome, on many legitimate uses
to require patients' consent every time their medical information is
either accessed or transmitted. Yet, it would be imprudent or even
dangerous to entirely sacrifice individual autonomy in the decision
process.
III. Constitutional Interpretations of the Right to Privacy
A. U.S. Constitutional Framework
In 1965, in Griswold v. Connecticut, the Supreme Court held that
it was unconstitutional for the government to prohibit married
couples from using contraceptives.25 While acknowledging that the
word "privacy" cannot be found anywhere in the Constitution, the
Court nevertheless concluded that the Constitution provides a "right
to privacy." 26 The Court explained that "specific guarantees in the
Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those
guarantees that helped give them life and substance. Various
guarantees create zones of privacy." 27 Thus, a right to privacy can be
found as an extension of a fundamental right, such as liberty. Then,
in 1972, in Eisenstadt v. Baird, the Court extended the reasoning in
Griswold, holding that the government also could not prevent
unmarried people from using contraceptives. 29 The Court emphasized
22. Solove, supra note 2, at 523-24.
23. Id. at 521-22.
24. Id. at 524.
25. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
26. See id. at 484-85.
27. Id. at 484 (citation and emphasis omitted).
28. Id. at 485.
29. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).
182 [Vol. 34:1
Electronic Medical Records and the Challenge to Privacy
that "[i]f the right to privacy means anything, it is the right of the
individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a
person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child." 0
A year later, in Roe v. Wade, the Court held that a right of
privacy included a "woman's decision whether or not to terminate her
pregnancy.",3  Instead of relying on the Griswold and Eisenstadt
reasoning that the Constitutional right of privacy comes from
"penumbras" of the Bill of Rights, the Roe Court grounded the right
in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court
held that a woman's personal liberty protects her from state
intervention in abortion decisions until the state interest in protecting
the health of the mother and the potential life become "compelling."32
Roe, therefore, also protects a kind of privacy in decision making
independent of outside governmental pressures. But it does not seem
to address whether the U.S. Constitution offers a right of privacy that
protects personal information.
In several other cases, however, the Supreme Court has more
closely addressed this latter issue. In 1977, the Court extended the
constitutionally protected "zone of privacy" beyond the "interest in
independence in making certain kinds of important decisions" to
include an "individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal
matters."" Here, the Court upheld a New York law that mandated
doctors to report all prescriptions for certain drugs, along with other
patient-specific information, which would then be entered into a
centralized state computer record.' To reach its decision, the Court
considered both the individuals' interest in avoiding disclosure of
personal matters and their interest in independently (without
government intervention) making certain important kinds of
decisions.35 Weighed against the state's need to protect the public's
health and to deter criminal activity, however, the Court found that
the potential harm of disclosing individuals' personal information was
not a serious enough threat to either of the privacy interests to
30. Id. (emphasis omitted).
31. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973).
32. Id. at 154
33. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977).
34. Id. at 591, 606.
35. See id. at 605.
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establish a constitutional violation.36
In Ferguson v. City of Charleston, the Supreme Court again
considered constitutionally founded rights of privacy and their
applicability to medical records." The central issue in Ferguson was
whether a state hospital policy requiring staff to test pregnant patients
for drug abuse and to report positive findings to the police violated
the Fourth Amendment. The Court held that the "special needs"
doctrine did not exempt the drug tests administered by the hospital
from the Fourth Amendment's general prohibition against
nonconsensual, warrantless, and unfounded searches." In this case,
the Court noted that "the unauthorized dissemination of such results
to third parties" represented an intrusion on privacy more serious
than using adverse test results to disqualify individuals from a
"particular benefit, such as a promotion."3 9 As the Court explained,
"[t]he reasonable expectation of privacy enjoyed by the typical
patient undergoing diagnostic tests in a hospital is that the results of
those tests will not be shared with nonmedical personnel without her
consent."40 Thus, the Court recognized that patients have an
"expectation of privacy" that includes a guard against disclosures to
certain third parties without consent.41 This, however, does not
necessarily provide patients with protections from hackers or from
the aggregation or manipulation of data by secondary users.
Even if U.S. courts reach a consensus on whether either the
Fourth or Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a clear right to privacy
of medical records, "[a]ny right to privacy under the federal or state
constitutions is, of course, limited to state action." 42 Because the
majority of the U.S. healthcare system is privatized, this renders "a
constitutional privacy protection of medical records less potent," and
thus, presents only "a partial solution to the problems surrounding
medical information privacy." 43  This leaves a significant gap that
should be filled by statutory means.
36. See id. at 601.
37. 532 U.S. 67, 69-70 (2001).
38. Id. at 85-86.
39. Id. at 78.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Gostin et al., supra note 19, at 12.
43. Catherine L. Glenn, Protecting Health Information Privacy: The Case For
Self-Regulation of Electronically Held Medical Records, 53 VAND. L. REv. 1605, 1621-
22 (2000).
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B. Canada's Constitutional Framework
In contrast, Canada has a more universal healthcare system. As
a result, a constitutionally protected privacy right in personal health
information may play a bigger role in shaping the privacy standards in
the context of electronic medical records.
Canada's Constitution, unlike that of the U.S., incorporates
many documents. The Constitution Act of 1982 sets out the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms ("Charter").44 Although
the Charter does not explicitly contain a right to privacy, the
Canadian Supreme Court, like the U.S. Supreme Court, has
recognized an implied right of privacy. In particular, the Canadian
Supreme Court has relied on section 8 (s. 8) of the Charter, which
provides individuals a right to be secure against unreasonable search
or seizure, for establishing broad privacy protection.45  As the
Canadian Supreme Court explained in R. v. Dyment, "[s]ection 8 is
concerned not only with the protection of property but also with the
protection of the privacy interests of individuals from search or
seizure." 46 In Dyment, the Canadian Supreme Court found that s. 8
rights had been violated when a doctor treating a patient after a car
accident drew blood that he then gave to a police officer without the
patient's consent or knowledge.47
To reach this decision, the Canadian Supreme Court relied on its
earlier interpretation of the Charter in Hunter v. Southam Inc. where
it found the Charter provides "unremitting protection of individual
rights and liberties." 48  The Canadian Supreme Court further
reasoned that:
a major, though not necessarily only, purpose of the constitutional
protection against unreasonable search and seizure under s. 8 is the
protection of the privacy of the individual.... And that right, like
other Charter rights must be interpreted in a broad and liberal
manner so as to secure the citizen's right to a reasonable
expectation of privacy against governmental encroachments. Its
spirit must not be constrained by narrow legalistic classifications
based on notions of property and the like which served to protect
44. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Constitution Act, Part I, 1982,
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11 (U.K.).
45. R. v. Dyment, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 417, 418 (Can.).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Hunter v. Southam Inc., [1984] 2. S.C.R. 145, 155 (Can.).
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this fundamental human value in earlier times.49
Although recognizing that the right to be free from unreasonable
search and seizure was "rationalized in terms of property interests,"o
the Canadian Supreme Court held that these traditional common law
origins did not restrict protection and application of s. 8's "broad and
general right."" The Canadian Supreme Court, however, did
emphasize that this right may not be absolute, as it must "be balanced
against societal needs, and in particular law enforcement, and that is
what s. 8 is intended to achieve."5 2 Thus, s. 8 of the Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms resembles the protection afforded U.S.
citizens in the Fourth Amendment. Both the U.S. and Canadian
Supreme Courts, therefore, have accepted that a Constitutional
protection against unreasonable search and seizure provides
individuals with a "reasonable expectation of privacy."53 This concept
of privacy found in the Fourth Amendment and s. 8 appears to equate
the value of privacy with liberty or the right to be free from
government intrusion to the greatest degree possible while balancing
the needs of society at large. Privacy conceived of in terms of liberty
appears primarily to be concerned with an individual's relationship
with its government.54
After holding that the freedom from state intrusion under s. 8 is
broad, the Canadian Supreme Court has identified three zones of
privacy over which, it is presumed, individual members of society
exercise control: personal space, dignity, and personal information."
The Canadian Supreme Court recognized that privacy as it relates to
information, as with privacy of the person, is "based on the notion of
the dignity and integrity of the individual."56 To further define this
zone of informational privacy, the Canadian Supreme Court looked
to the Privacy Commissioner's interpretation that "[t]his notion of
privacy derives from the assumption that all information about a
49. Dyment, 2 S.C.R. at 426.
50. Id. (citing Entick v. Carrington, (1765) 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (K.B.)).
51. Hunter, 2 S.C.R at 158; see also Dyment, 2 S.C.R. at 427.
52. Dyment, 2 S.C.R. at 428; see also Hunter, 2 S.C.R at 159-60.
53. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. at 78; Dyment, 2 S.C.R. at 428 (citing
Hunter, 2 S.C.R at 159-60).
54. See Avner Levin & Mary Jo Nicholson, Privacy Law in the United States, the
EU, and Canada: The Allure of the Middle Ground, 2 U. Ottawa L. & Tech. J. 357,
391 (2005).
55. Id. at 392.
56. Dyment, 2 S.C.R. at 429.
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person is in a fundamental way his own, for him to communicate or
retain for himself as he sees fit." 7 For both the Canadian Supreme
Court and the Federal Privacy Commission, the right to control the
manner in which one's personal information is used forms a critical
part of one's dignity." And the right to privacy is, at least partly, a
right to maintain that personal dignity.
In Dyment, the Canadian Supreme Court went on to explain
that:
In modem society, especially, retention of information about
oneself is extremely important. We may, for one reason or another,
wish or be compelled to reveal such information, but situations
abound where the reasonable expectations of the individual that
the information shall remain confidential to the person to whom,
and restricted to the purposes for which it is divulged, must be
protected.
Here, the Canadian Supreme Court recognized that people must
frequently disclose personal information in the modern world, but it
also emphasized that this does not mean all expectations of privacy
are gone. Instead, the Canadian Supreme Court highlighted that
despite the increased flow of information, individuals still retain an
ongoing interest in their personal information that deserves
protection.
In McInerney v. MacDonald, the Canadian Court emphasized
that it is of "primary significance" that the nature of the information
contained in an individual's medical record is highly private and
personal.6 1 As the Court observed, "[i]t is information that goes to
the personal integrity and autonomy of the patient.... [Sluch
information remains in a fundamental sense one's own, for the
individual to communicate or retain as she or he sees fit." 62 The
Court also noted the fiduciary nature of the doctor-patient
relationship, explaining that "information about oneself revealed to a
doctor acting in a professional capacity remains, in a fundamental
sense, one's own.... The confiding of the information to the
57. Id. (quoting Dep't. of Justice of Canada, Report of the Privacy Task Force,
Privacy and Computers 13 (1972)).
58. Levin & Nicholson, supra note 54, at 392.
59. Dyment, 2 S.C.R. at 429-30.
60. See McInerney v. MacDonald, [19921 2 S.C.R. 138, 148 (Can.).
61. Id.
62. Id.
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physician for medical purposes gives rise to an expectation that the
patient's interests in and control of the information will continue."
Again, the Court considers privacy as the right to shape one's persona
by controlling how one's personal information is used. This right is
not lost upon disclosure to a medical professional.
As the above suggests, informational privacy is viewed as a
consent-based right. Patient privacy in relation to medical records,
therefore, is expressed through the right to take part in decisions
regarding their personal health information. The Canadian Supreme
Court seems to focus on patient control and autonomy as
fundamental elements of informational privacy, mandating patients to
retain some degree of control over their health information. As one
commentator explained, "a patient's privacy rights in regard to his
health information are respected if he has an opportunity to exercise
some control over it by consenting to, or withholding consent for,
various uses or disclosures."" While the Canadian Supreme Court
uses the words "control" and "autonomy," this language appears to
be absent in the U.S. Constitution case law regarding privacy.
C. Comparison of the U.S. and Canadian Constitutional
Approaches
The right of privacy in the Roe line of cases established that the
Constitution protects a certain kind of decisional freedom. That is,
the law recognized that the constitutionally protected concept of
"liberty" encompasses an individual's right to make certain choices
independently, free from outside governmental intrusion. This
constitutional right of privacy, however, does not offer the individual
control or protection over the collection or electronic storage of
personal information or how it is used. Thus, the Roe concept of the
right to make certain decisions in "privacy" does not afford patients a
guarantee of control over their personal health information once they
have made the initial decision to disclose that information to
healthcare providers. The Canadian cases, in contrast, seem to more
fully support a constitutional privacy interest in health information
that continues even after disclosure.
The American constitutional concept of privacy seems to focus
63. Id. at 150-51 (emphasis added).
64. Nola M. Ries, Patient Privacy in a Wired (and Wireless) World: Approaches to
Consent in the Context of Electronic Health Records, 43 ALTA. L.REv. 681, 687
(2006).
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on the relationship between individuals and government and on
establishing the appropriate permissible level of government
intrusion in the private sphere.5 It is only when government goes too
far, compromising an individual's constitutionally protected right of
liberty, that a privacy invasion occurs. Canadians, it seems, perceive
their privacy somewhat differently, emphasizing personal autonomy.
They believe that members of society should be free to decide for
themselves what is important to keep under their own control. As
much of the language above suggests, Canada views personal dignity
as a key part of the right to privacy. In this way, the Canadian
concept of privacy more closely resembles the European view, in
which privacy is considered a fundamental human right. This is
6
reflected in many international conventions on the subject. As one
scholar explained, "[t]he influence of international law on Canada's
privacy regime has been felt at the most fundamental level, in helping
us define our rights."'
This consent-based model, however, can raise issues in the
electronic health records (EHR) context because achieving
meaningful consent is often difficult. As one scholar remarked, "But
how far does individual autonomy and control ... extend to
collection, use and disclosure of one's health information, particularly
for the purpose of providing care?"" As both the U.S. and Canada
face the privacy issues resulting from electronic health records, both
legal systems will have to reevaluate or rebalance a patient's
autonomy (as expressed through consent and control) against the
need for information to move quickly and freely within the healthcare
world. This will no doubt prove challenging in both systems, though
for somewhat different reasons.
IV. Federal Privacy Regulation
A. U.S. Federal Regulation of Privacy
Traditionally, in the U.S., state law has governed the protection
of health care records, but as technology made EHR a reality,
Congress recognized the need for, and benefits of, a more uniform
65. Levin & Nicholson, supra note 54, at 361-62.
66. Patricia Kosseim, The Landscape of Rules Governing Access to Personal
Information for Health Research: A View from Afar, 11 HEALTH 201, 206 (2003).
67. Id.
68. Ries, supra note 64, at 688.
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approach to health care records. In 1999 Congress passed the Heath
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA).6 9 The focus
of HIPAA was to establish national standards for electronic health
care transactions that allowed for the more efficient flow of health
information while providing security measures to ensure the privacy
of health data." As Congress was unable to meet its self-imposed
deadline for passing enabling legislation," the Department of Health
and Human Services (HHS) developed its own set of regulations for
electronic medical record transaction and storage, the Privacy Rule,
which came into effect in December 2000.72
The Privacy Rule applies only to certain "covered entities."
These include: health plans, health care clearinghouses, and health
care providers who transmit health information electronically. 73 The
Privacy Rule places limitations on how covered entities can use and
when they can disclose "individually identifiable" or potentially
identifiable health information in any form - electronic and paper.74
The HHS regulations define this "Protected Health Information"
(PHI) as including any data held or transmitted by a covered entity
which concerns health status, provisions of health care, or payment
for health care that can be linked to an individual." The Privacy Rule
obligates covered entities to follow certain procedures and to take
security measures designed to ensure that PHI remains as private as
possible.
HIPAA was intended to combat the patchwork approach to
health information privacy, but it fails in several crucial ways to truly
provide a national privacy standard. First, the Privacy Rule does not
apply to all healthcare organizations handling medical records.
Second, HIPAA acts solely as a regulatory floor;77 federal standards
only preempt those state privacy regulations that offer patients less
stringent protection than those provided by HIPAA, and those that
69. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320d-2-1320d-6 (2009).
70. See Gostin & Hodge, Jr., supra note 1, at 1459, 1466.
71. Id. at 1458.
72. 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 164 (2001).
73. 45 C.F.R. § 160.102 (2001).
74. C.F.R. § 160.102(a)(3) (2001).
75. 45 C.F.R. § 164.501 (2001).
76. Joy L. Pritts, Altered States: State Health Privacy Laws and the Impact of the
Federal Health Privacy Rule, 2 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 327, 344 (2002).
77. Id. at 343.
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conflict with federal regulations.7 ' This partial preemption rule may
make compliance cumbersome in certain situations in which more
than one set of privacy obligations applies, such as, for example,
patients receiving treatment in several different states. This, coupled
with the fact that the Privacy Rule does not apply to all healthcare
organizations handling medical records, reduces HIPAA's
effectiveness measures in protecting patient privacy from harms
created by technology. In addition, the absence of standards
applicable across the nation perpetuates a certain level of inefficiency.
For instance, it is difficult for healthcare providers to realize the full
benefits of electronic heath records systems. These fundamental
problems with HIPPA ultimately may hinder "[e]fforts to move
toward nationwide use of electronic medical records and related
information technology False."79
The Privacy Rule charges covered entities with keeping PHI
confidential, but the regulations also recognize various lawful
secondary uses, reflecting "[t]rade-offs between public good and
personal privacy."' In addition, covered entities may disclose PHI to
outsiders without prior patient consent under the following
circumstances and purposes:
1. to law enforcement officials
2. to judicial and administrative proceedings for commercial
marketing purposes
3. to parents of unemancipated minors
4. to "significant others," such as family members, close friends,
or designated persons, of an adult or emancipated minor
5. to an authorized public health authority and for health
research"
As originally drafted, the Privacy Rule favored patient control.
The Bush amendments, in contrast, gave healthcare providers more
freedom to use and disclose patient information without first
obtaining written consent.! Initially, the Privacy Rule gave
78. Id.
79. John W. Hill, Arlen W. Langvardt & Jonathan E. Rinehart, Bottom-Up or
Top-Down? Removing the Privacy Law Obstacles to Healthcare Reform in the
National Healthcare Crisis, 84 IND. L.J. SuPp. 23, 33 (2009).
80. Gostin et al., supra note 19, at 16.
81. Id. at 16-17; see also 45 C.F.R. § 164.512 (2010).
82. Edward J. Markey, Commerce With a Conscience: Balancing Privacy and
Profit in a Digital World, 41 HARV. J. ON LEGIS 377, 382 (2004)
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individuals the right to withhold consent in order to prevent their
personal health information from being used or disclosed for even
routine purposes." However, covered entities can now disclose PHI
without prior patient consent for purposes relating to "treatment,
payment, or healthcare operations." 8 In addition, a covered entity
may lawfully provide PHI to a "business associate" (e.g., corporations
such as law or accounting firms with a business relationship with a
covered entity), to use for routine purposes without patients'
knowledge or consent and even against their will." This could lead to
various abuses of personal rights.
The Privacy Rule attempts to strike a balance between the
patient's right to maintain control over personal information,
healthcare providers' need to be able to access information quickly
and efficiently, and other secondary uses such as research. The
difficulty lies in determining exactly how the law ought to evaluate
these valid but often competing interests. Further, a certain degree of
patient autonomy must inevitably be sacrificed regardless of exactly
how the balance is struck.
Even when patient consent is not required prior to disclosures,
the Privacy Rule instructs covered entities to notify patients that their
medical information will be disclosed and how it will be used." This
again reflects a shift away from a model emphasizing full patient
autonomy and informed consent, which seriously limits the degree of
control patients possess over the uses of their medical information
after the initial disclosure.
Consistent with this trend, the Bush amendments have defined
what constitutes impermissible "marketing" more narrowly than the
initial rule, favoring commerce and corporate interests over
confidentiality.' This means that prior patient authorization is often
not needed for communications related to health products or
services." It is thus easier for commercial enterprises such as a
pharmaceutical company to obtain a patient's prescription history and
to send him or her unsolicited promotions of health-related products,
regardless of whether this individual wishes to receive this
83. Id. at 383.
84. 45 C.F.R. § 164.506(c)(1) (2010).
85. Markey, supra note 82 at 383; accord 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(e)(1) (2010).
86. 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(i) (2010).
87. Markey, supra note 82, at 382-85.
88. Id. at 393.
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information.89 The resulting flood of junk mail and email spam
becomes another unwanted source of intrusion into one's private life
for which one has no clear remedy. The disclosure exceptions for
commercial marketing, therefore, can lead to breaches of privacy; yet
this loss of autonomy does not appear to be in exchange for any
important public purpose."
When a covered entity discloses PHI for a permissible purpose,
the Privacy Rule imposes a "minimum necessary" standard that limits
the amount of information that may be disclosed. The amount of
PHI revealed must not exceed the amount reasonably necessary to
accomplish the purpose of the disclosure. Therefore, the patient's full
medical record may not be disclosed when only certain information in
the record actually pertains to the purpose of the disclosure." If
individual health information can be redacted, such that it cannot be
linked to a particular patient, covered entities are permitted to use
and to disclose the information without authorization or any other
permission specified in the Privacy Rule.' When taken together,
"these measures can enhance patient autonomy and promote trust in
the health care system."3
However, the above safeguards may prove too weak to be
convincing or reassuring. Extending the permissible disclosures to
include business associates and allowing more uses to be exempt from
the "marketing" restriction rapidly increases the number of potential
people who could view and use individuals' health information
without either their consent or knowledge. This also expands the
opportunity for misuse of personal health data, as "the ability to
consolidate and call in data from disparate locations in a distributed
network may mean that there is no permanent database under the
control of any one entity: data will simply travel as required between
authenticated users of the system."94
To many, the perceived or actual danger lies in the possibility of
improper use by approved users of the system or the aggregation of
one's personal information from a variety of authorized sources.
Unfortunately, as data can spread so quickly, a model that is
89. Id. at 393-94.
90. Gostin & Hodges, supra note 1, at 1478-79.
91. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(b)(1) (2010)
92. See 45 CF.R. § 164.502(d)(2) (2010).
93. Gostin & Hodges, supra note 19, at 21.
94. Magnusson, supra note 18, at 685.
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primarily concerned with patients' rights in relation to consent to
disclosure of their medical information would be impractical for both
patients and healthcare professionals and would not address the most
pressing privacy issues. Thus, in the electronic world, "health privacy
laws must focus not on people, nor records, but on health data,
including . . . conditions for the transmission and storage of data."95
Although encrypting personal information prior to transmission
and creating access practices enhances patient confidentiality, "one
'hack' into the system, or one error by a data administrator, may
compromise more data, as well as the records of a larger number of
people."" The scale of the risk involving electronic medical record
systems, therefore, is huge.
The protections offered by the HIPAA Privacy Rule often
appear "more like a catalogue of exceptions"" than a comprehensive
grant of authority that allows individuals to maintain the primary
control over when and to whom their health records may be
disclosed.
B. Canada's Regulation
In Canada, at the federal level, several important laws exist
which are designed to safeguard informational privacy. In 1983,
Canada passed the Privacy Act to "protect the privacy of individuals
with respect to personal information about themselves held by a
government institution.",8 The Act also provides individuals with a
right of access to that information. The Canadian Privacy Act defines
personal information broadly as: "information about an identifiable
individual that is recorded in any form."" As the Supreme Court of
Canada emphasized, "[t]he language is deliberately broad and
entirely consistent with the great pains that have been taken to
safeguard individual liberty. Its intent is to capture any information
about a specific person, subject only to specific exceptions."'oo Unlike
in the U.S., where the general federal privacy legislation does not
apply in the healthcare context, the Canadian Privacy Act does offer
protection for some personal health information. This significant
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Terry, supra note 16, at 26.
98. Privacy Act, R.S.C., ch. P 21 (1985) (Can.).
99. Id. (emphasis added).
100. Dagg v. Canada, [1997], 2 S.C.R. 403, 405 (emphasis added).
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difference results from the fact that the U.S. healthcare system is
entirely privatized and thus is beyond the reach of legislation
designed to regulate federal governmental action. In contrast, since
Canada has a universal healthcare system, the federal Privacy Act
does have some impact on how privacy of health records is addressed.
Recognizing an additional need to consider privacy issues in the
private as well as public sector, Canada enacted Personal Information
Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA) in 2000.101
PIPEDA regulates how private sector organizations collect, use, and
disclose personal information while engaging in "commercial
activities.""2 Although healthcare is for the most part publicly
funded, private healthcare providers do exist. These providers,
however, fall under the PIPEDA regulations because the funding
source does not determine whether an activity is designated
"commercial" or not."' An individual's health information is
regulated by the Privacy Act or PIPEDA, depending on whether the
healthcare provider is a government institution or a private actor.m
In Canada, as in the U.S., the absence of a single piece of privacy
legislation applicable to every healthcare professional means
protection of personal health information varies somewhat. This may
prove problematic because for the full benefits of electronic health
records to be realized, a uniform approach to protection health data
seems preferable. Uniformity would contribute both to making the
flow of health information more efficient and to convincing patients
that their information is well protected.
PIPEDA introduced measures to protect personal information in
the private sector. In order to ensure effectiveness, it establishes
broad privacy protection and specifically includes protection of
information in electronic form. To achieve this, PIPEDA lays out a
number of basic principles: accountability, identifying, purpose,
consent, limiting collection, limiting use, disclosure and retention,
accuracy, safeguards, openness, individual access, challenging
compliance.' All personal information collected, used, or disclosed
in connection with a "commercial activity" must be regulated in such
101. Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, 2000 S.C.,
ch. 5 (Can.) [hereinafter PIPEDA].
102. Id., ch. 5, § 4(1)(a) (Can.).
103. Ries, supra note 64, at 692.
104. PIPEDA, 2000 S.C., ch. 5, § 4 (Can.).
105. See Ries, supra note 64, at 692.
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a way as to conform to these basic privacy principles." Although the
Canadian approach to federal level privacy regulation of the private
sector has the advantage of offering uniform guidelines, it still does
not guarantee uniformity in how these privacy principles are
implemented.
Thus, PIPEDA offers a co-regulatory model: the industry
develops the specific standards and implements them while these
standards are overseen by the governmental privacy agency to ensure
compliance with the overarching private sector-wide privacy
scheme.1o' In the U.S., there is no comparable overarching privacy
legislation that protects personal information in the private sector."1s
This has proven to be problematic. Instead, at the federal level, the
U.S. has addressed privacy issues through industry-specific legislation,
such as HIPAA."' This may provide certain advantages. For
instance, the industry-specific approach may afford greater privacy
protection because of the specificity inherent in legislation geared at a
single subject area. This may be especially beneficial in regard to the
highly sensitive nature of personal medical data. For example, the
comprehensive laws in Canada do not define what information is
"sensitive," merely stating instead that ". . . any information can be
sensitive, depending on the context.""o In some ways, this definition
creates more ambiguity because HIPAA clearly targets personal
identifiable health information. At the same time, PIPEDA's more
flexible definition of "sensitive" information may allow for broader
protection.
Although PIPEDA provides a broad privacy protection scheme,
as noted above, it does not successfully combat the problems of
patchwork regulation. Notably, it allows the Canadian federal
government to exempt organizations or commercial activities in
provinces which have privacy laws deemed "substantially similar" to
the federal law."' In fact, Alberta, British Columbia, and Quebec
106. PIPEDA, 2000 S.C., ch. 5, § 4.1(4).
107. See Levin & Nicholson, supra note 54, at 380-81.
108. Rebecca L. Woodard, Note, Is Your Medical Information Safe? A
Comparision[sic] of Comprehensive and Sectoral Privacy and Security Laws, 15 IND.
INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 147, 154 (2004).
109. Id.
110. PIPEDA, 2000 S.C., ch. 5 (Can.).
111. PIPEDA, 2000 S.C., ch. 5, § 26(2)(b) (Can.); see also Substantially Similar
Provincial Legislation, OFF. OF THE PRIVACY COMMISSIONER OF CANADA,
http://www.priv.gc.callegislation/ss-index-e.cfm#content top (last visited Sept. 18,
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have enacted such laws; thus the private sector in those provinces is
subject to those specific privacy laws rather than to the federal
standards.12 This structure resembles the U.S. system. HIPAA
always acts as a regulatory floor, but in those states which have
enacted more stringent medical privacy laws, the stricter laws will
govern medical transactions. Thus, in both Canada and U.S., federal
laws do not completely preempt state or province regulation in the
area of medical privacy.
A key difference, however, is that, unlike HIPAA, PIPEDA
seems to promote greater uniformity in privacy legislation because of
the "substantially similar" requirement that must be met. HIPAA
contains no such analogous provision; it does not mandate any degree
of similarity between the state medical privacy laws and the federal
regulations. Instead, HIPAA requires that state law merely offer the
patient a higher degree of privacy protection than that in HIPAA."3
It does not, however, specify the form or content of these regulations.
This leaves a high level of ambiguity, imprecision, and confusion for
healthcare professionals and patients in a particularly sensitive area,
namely, human rights. Thus, the Canadian law seems to be moving
more directly toward the establishment of a true national standard for
privacy protection.
The current U.S. legislation does not explicitly appear to be
striving for a national scheme, at least in the significant area of
establishing some kind of general privacy protection for personal
information in the private sector. This shortfall may, in part, result
from the fact that the U.S. does not traditionally regulate the private
sector as it would conflict with our prevailing notions of a free-market
economy.114 As a result, the U.S. approach to data privacy, in contrast
to the Canadian approach, must rely in great measure on self-
regulation, largely based on company or industry-wide self-imposed
or aspirational standards."' Therefore, comprehensive privacy
legislation will likely continue as only industry-specific. This could
2010).
112. Substantially Similar Provincial Legislation, OFF. OF THE PRIVACY
COMMISSIONER OF CANADA, http://www.priv.gc.callegislation/ss-indexe.cfm
#contenttop (last visited September 18, 2010).
113. Gostin & Hodge, Jr., supra note 1, at 1465-66.
114. Jennifer McClennan & Vadim Schick, '0, Privacy' Canada's Importance In
The Development Of The International Data Privacy Regime, 38 GEO. J. INT'L L. 669,
677 (2007).
115. Id.
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shackle the development of a fair and enlightened policy for some
time.
The Canadian federal government has demonstrated its
commitment to safeguarding electronic health records through its
funding of a not-for-profit organization, Health Infoway.116 Its
purpose is to work with the provinces and territories to foster and
accelerate the development and adoption of pan-Canadian electronic
health information systems.17 This comprehensive system will likely
help address some privacy issues resulting from electronic
transmission of sensitive information by creating a uniform approach
to security and privacy expectations; but it may not adequately
safeguard secondary uses or aggregation of personal data. Despite
the potential benefits a structure of this kind affords, the fundamental
differences between the U.S. and Canadian healthcare parameters
and attitude toward free-markets makes it unlikely that U.S. could
ever develop a comparable plan. Because the U.S. healthcare system
will likely continue to be largely owned and operated by various
private entities, security measures and privacy standards will be
harder to implement in the U.S.
Canada's privacy regime differs from that of the U.S. in another
important aspect: Canada has established a Privacy Commission and
Commissioner, who is responsible for enforcing federal privacy
laws."' The Privacy Commissioner operates independently, separate
from the Prime Minister's cabinet, and he or she reports directly to
the Canadian House of Commons and the Senate.H9  The
Commissioner has the power to investigate complaints brought by
individuals, to conduct audits under the two federal laws, and to
publish reports about personal information handling practices in both
public and private sector.12 The U.S. has no consolidated agency
strictly dedicated to dealing with privacy issues across the industries
and private sector. In addition, HIPAA and the Privacy Rule do not
give individuals a private right of action. Instead, enforcement of the
Privacy Rule is left to HHS's Office for Civil Rights and the
116. About Canada Health Infoway CANADA HEALTH INFOWAY INC.,
http://www.infoway-inforoute.ca/lang-en/about-infoway (last visited March 1, 2009).
117. Id.
118. See Canada Privacy Act, R.S.C., ch. P 21 (1985); see also PIPEDA, supra note
102, at ch. 5 § 4.
119. About Us, OFF. OF THE PRIVACY COMMISSION OF CANADA, http://www.priv.
gc.calaboutUs/index-e.cfm (last visited March 1, 2009).
120. Id.
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Department of Justice. 121
Although the U.S. constitutional and common law approaches to
privacy and confidentiality "suggested a rights-based approach to
legal confidentiality that paralleled the autonomy principle,"122
HIPAA represents a major shift in emphasis. This seems again to
undermine patients' sense of control over their personal health
information. Thus, significantly, in the U.S., "'[r]ights for individuals
to control their information,' . . . have a less certain future." 123 As
commentators have observed, "the federal standards have gutted the
nascent rights-based approach to privacy and confidentiality,
preferring ... [a] rationale that is almost totally focused on
institutions and compliance., 124 Canada, in marked contrast, appears
to be continuing, in both its legislation and common law
jurisprudence, to pursue a more consent-rights driven approach to
protecting personal health information. Ultimately, which approach
will prove to offer patients the greatest protection against the dangers
of unauthorized access and secondary uses remains to be seen.
V. Conclusion
The laws in both the U.S. and Canada have recognized the need
to balance individuals' privacy with the common good. Therefore,
like many rights, privacy is not absolute. Courts and legislatures
constantly struggle to address the needs of society without entirely
compromising those of the individual. As technology continues to
develop, the balancing becomes increasingly complex and difficult.
Electronic record keeping presents exciting possibilities for
healthcare to be delivered in a more organized and effective manner.
It also has the potential to offer patients more security for their
medical records and ensure a greater degree of accuracy and
accessibility, thus improving overall care. But, because such
centralized systems contain large amounts of personal data, including
information about a patient's mental and physical health, social
behaviors, and employment and financial status, protecting the
privacy of health data is critical. Without adequate safeguards for
121. 45 CFR §§ 160.300-160.312 (2010); If a complaint describes an action that
potentially violates criminal provision of HIPAA (42 U.S.C. 1320d-6), OCR can refer
it to the DOJ.
122. Magnusson, supra note 18, at 688.
123. Id.
124. Terry, supra note 16, at 13-14.
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electronic records, health information can become subject to
unauthorized access, disclosures, and unwelcome secondary uses,
potentially leading to social stigma and discrimination by insurance
companies, healthcare professionals, and institutions, as well as
employers. Patients need and want to feel that they have control over
the use and circulation of their personal information and appropriate
protection against the harmful consequences caused by the use or
disclosure of their personal health information. Whether or not the
fear that electronic medical records compromise privacy is well-
founded, it nevertheless remains essential that patients believe that
their personal information is secure. Otherwise, they may be
reluctant to communicate openly with healthcare professionals,
causing harm to themselves and impeding important public health
functions and research. Thus, there is also a communal benefit to
ensuring privacy.
What constitutes a violation of privacy, and what harms occur as
a result of such violations, is not static. Technology in particular is
reshaping how developed countries view privacy, while continually
presenting new privacy dilemmas. For instance, aggregation of data
can link together information which, independently is insignificant,
but together is compromising. Thus, the law must create a privacy
framework flexible enough to continually reevaluate the balance
between patient privacy rights and the societal need to collect
information.
As Canada shares with the U.S. a language, a common law legal
tradition, and a similar geographic size and political structure,
examining Canada's approach to this complex privacy problem could
potentially offer the U.S. some alternative ways of addressing it.
Although clearly Canada's system also has its shortcomings, several
differences seem noteworthy. Perhaps most strikingly, Canada has
set up a Privacy Commission and Commissioner to oversee the
implementation of federal privacy regulations. The merits of this
innovation include streamlining consistency and compliance,
providing individual citizens with a clear remedy, and establishing
straightforward checks and balances. Also, because healthcare is
largely a public operation in Canada, this somewhat simplifies the
issues there. For example, privacy regulations that restrict the federal
government automatically apply to healthcare. All these elements
may help promote trust in the system. In addition, Canada's
PIPEDA offers broad privacy protection across the private sector,
something the U.S. currently lacks.
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In the end, neither country has yet addressed the current
challenges with complete success: How to adequately protect
individuals from the new harms of widespread availability of
centralized electronic records while simultaneously developing the
full potential benefits of keeping accurate and comprehensive data.
The importance of this issue for human rights and human health
make it imperative that we continue to search for a satisfactory legal
framework that achieves these goals. A stance of open-mindedness,
creativity, and flexibility will be necessary to accomplish this goal.
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